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I search for a “scale”  effect in countries.  I use a panel data set that includes 200 countries over forty
years and link the population of a country to a host of economic and social phenomena.  Using both
graphical and statistical techniques, I search for an impact of size on the level of income, inflation,
material well-being, health, education, the quality of a country’s institutions, heterogeneity, and a
number of different international indices and rankings.  I have little success; small countries are more
open to international trade than large countries, but are not systematically different otherwise.
Andrew K. Rose





1. Motivation and Summary 
  Countries differ a lot in size.  As of July 2005, there were over 64,000 Chinese for each 
of the 20,303 residents of Palau.
1  There are now eleven countries with populations in excess of 
100 million, and eleven with populations less than 100 thousand.  This is a striking fact; there 
appears to be no optimal country size, and no noticeable convergence towards one.
2  
Nations do not come in standard sizes.  This may seem natural, even obvious; after all, 
there is enormous variation in the size of firms and cities (as well as mammals and galaxies, 
among other things).
3  This variation leads to an interesting question that is the subject of this 
short exploratory paper: does the size of a country matter?  I take a broad-brush empirical 
approach and ask whether larger countries perform systematically different than larger countries 
in a number of different economic and social dimensions.  They do not. 
 
2. Why Might Size Matter? 
There has been little quantitative work that on the linkages between country size and 
country performance.  Accordingly, as an exploratory analysis this paper takes the “Estimate, 
don’t test” message seriously.  But while there is little empirical work, numerous theorists have 
discussed the effects of national size, especially in recent economics and not-so-recent political 
philosophy.  Much recent economics has “scale effects” so that larger countries should be more 
successful countries.  At the other extreme, a number of celebrated political philosophers argue 
that smaller countries make better states.  There is also a strand of reasoning that articulates a 
tradeoff between the benefits and costs of size.  I now review these briefly; my objective is 
simply to point out that size matters in a number of different literatures.   2
Bigger is Better.  Size has an effect on output in a number of different recent literatures of 
interest in economics.  Increasing returns remain an intrinsic part of the “new wave” trade theory 
that began in the 1980s, and lead to offshoots in economic geography and urban economics.  
Agglomeration effects are also an important element of endogenous macroeconomic growth.  
Finally, they are part of the political economy literature that focuses on the provision of public 
goods.  There is also a long tradition in political philosophy arguing that size is positively 
disadvantageous. 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) analyze the impact of increasing returns on trade, and 
discuss economies of scale both internal and external to the firm.  The former can be due to 
plant-runs or dynamic scale economies; while the latter can be due to an effect of scale on the 
variety of intermediate inputs, effects on market structure, or information spillovers.  When there 
are increasing returns to scale and transportation costs, countries also exert a “home market 
effect” (Krugman, 1980).  Agglomeration effects are also used in modeling urban dynamics as 
part of the new economic geography (e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999 and Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright, 2004).  Indeed, the importance of numerous “border” effects is consistent 
with the fact that a number of economic relations are more efficient within a single country than 
in separate countries (Hess and van Wincoop, 2000; Drazen, 2000). 
  The literature on scale effects in macroeconomics stretches back a long way to Adam 
Smith’s idea that the specialization of labor is limited by the extent of the market.  Robinson 
(1960) lists a number of reasons why there might be scale effects across countries, including: 
enhanced intra-national integration (of capital, goods, and especially labor and services markets); 
higher productivity due to enhanced specialization or longer production runs; a scale effect on 
competition; and greater ability to respond flexibly to technological progress.   3
  Much recent work in growth theory has formalized such scale effects.  Many models rely 
on learning by doing and/or knowledge spillovers, and result in the conclusion that larger 
countries should grow faster: e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  Indeed, scale effects are 
generic to endogenous growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998 p 28).  Jones (1999, p 143) 
discusses three classes of endogenous growth models and shows that they all have a scale effect: 
“the size of the economy affects either the long-run growth rate or the long-run level of per 
capita income” since larger countries can support more research which delivers a higher level or 
growth rate of productivity. A recent survey provided by Ventura (2005) refers (p 92) to “the 
standard idea that economic growth in the world economy is determined by a tension between 
diminishing returns and market size effects to capital accumulation.”   
The most authoritative work of relevance in public economics is the recent book by 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003), hereafter AS.  They list (pp 3-4) five benefits of large population 
size: 1) lower per-capita costs of public goods (monetary and financial institutions, judicial 
system, communication infrastructure, police and crime prevention, public health, etc) and more 
efficient tax systems; 2) cheaper per-capita defense and military costs; 3) greater productivity 
due to specialization (though access to international markets may reduce this effect); 4) greater 
ability to provide regional insurance; and 5) greater ability to redistribute income within the 
country.   
Tradeoffs Exist.  In all this work, larger countries are predicted to be richer or more 
efficient.  There is little analysis of the costs of size.  AS discuss two costs of larger country size.  
A minor consideration is the potential for administrative and/or congestion costs.  The only real 
issue of import is that larger countries have more diverse preferences, cultures, and languages.  
The AS hypothesis (p 6) is that “on balance, heterogeneity of preferences tends to bring about   4
political and economic costs that are traded off against the benefits of size.”
4  This reasoning is 
not new.  In chapter XVII of the Leviathan Hobbes argued that small populations were 
insufficient to deter invasion and provide security, while excessively large countries would be 
incapable of the common defense because of lack of a common purpose and internal distractions.  
Olson (1982) argues that small homogenous societies are less burdened by the logic of collective 
action and have more capacity to create prosperity; see also Robinson (1960) and Wei (1991).
5 
Small is Beautiful.  In arguing that size has its costs, AS join a long tradition of political 
philosophers, many of whom believe that small is beautiful.  Plato quantified the optimal size of 
a city-state at 5,040 households.
6  Similarly in Politics Aristotle argued that a country should be 
small enough for the citizens to know (and hear!) each other; the entire territory should be small 
enough to be surveyed from a hill.  More recently, Rousseau  stated:  
“Large populations, vast territories! There you have the first and foremost reason 
for the misfortunes of mankind, above all the countless calamities that weaken 
and destroy polite peoples. Almost all small states, republics and monarchies 
alike, prosper, simply because they are small, because all their citizens know each 
other and keep an eye on each other, and because their rulers can see for 
themselves the harm that is being done and the good that is theirs to do and can 
look on as their orders are being executed. Not so the large nations: they stagger 
under the weight of their own numbers, and their peoples lead a miserable 
existence -- either, like yourselves, in conditions of anarchy, or under petty tyrants 
that the requirements of hierarchy oblige their kings to set over them.”
7 
 
This line of reasoning stretches all the way to at least Myrdal (1968). 
Montesquieu famously believed that republican countries were necessarily small in both 
territory and population.  His logic was that large countries were necessarily diverse and thus 
required strong governments, resulting in monarchies or even despots (for very large countries).  
Small countries without excessive wealth were the most democratic.  He famously wrote:   5
“In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; 
it is subordinated to various exceptions; it depends on accidents.  In a small 
republic, the public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each 
citizen; abuses are less extensive, and consequently less protected.”
8 
 
Interestingly, Montesquieu’s logic was inverted by David Hume (1752), who argued in 
“Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” that 
" in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass 
and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be 
admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the 
higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are 
so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or 
passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." 
 
Madison famously used this logic to argue that large countries were less likely to be affected by 




To my knowledge, there has been only almost no work on a national scale effect on the 
level of economic well-being (Drazen, 2000 argues that the reverse is also true).  A number of 
different studies in Robinson (1960) tested for economies of scale and found them to be mostly 
unimportant.  They also considered the impact of country size on national patterns of 
specialization, diversification, and competition, usually with a similar lack of success. 
By way of contrast, there has been much work done which searches for a scale effect in 
economic growth.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are typical of the literature and provide 
limited evidence of a scale effect on growth.  Alcalá and Ciccone (2003) finds an effect of 
market size on growth, although Sala-i-Martin (1997) does not using a general structure 
econometric search methodology.  Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000, 2004) focus on   6
whether the effect (if any) of size on growth is mediated through openness; they find moderately 
supportive results using a panel of data and IV techniques.
10  But most of the focus in AS is in 
the causes and determination of country size rather than its effects. 
The theoretical work in the literature implies that one might expect to find an effect of 
size on: output; inflation; communications infrastructure; crime; health; output and productivity; 
inequality; and heterogeneity.  Rather than return to investigating growth, I now attempt to 
extend the search for scale effects and investigate whether a country’s population has a 
substantial effect on the level of economic activity. 
 
3. Empirics 
My strategy in this paper is to take a broad-brush approach to the effect of scale on 
economic and social phenomena.  I look at a large number of variables that are potentially 
affected by a country’s population size, choosing them either on the basis of intrinsic interest or 
because they are suggested by the literature.  I search for signs of a scale effect using both graphs 
and more conventional statistical techniques. 
  The heart of my data set consists of populations sampled at decadal intervals, starting in 
1960 and proceeding through 2000.  My default source for population data (and indeed for many 
series) is The World Development Indicators, produced by the World Bank.  A few missing 
population observations are filled in from old versions of the CIA’s World Factbook and the 
UN’s Statistical Yearbook, so that I have observations on 208 “countries” for each of 5 different 
years.  A list of the countries included is tabulated in Appendix Table A1; the sources for my key 
variables are tabulated in Table A2, and some descriptive statistics are provided in Table A3.    7
The only “country” I exclude of any size is Taiwan, province of China (for data availability 
reasons).  Which brings me to the word “country.”   
There is no universal definition of a “country.”  Economists often ignore places such as 
Niue, a small island in the South Pacific that has been self-governing in free association with 
New Zealand since 1974 and had an estimated 2005 population of 2,166.  Is Niue really a 
“country?”  As of July 2005, Tuvalu had a population estimated to be 11,636; Nauru had 13,048 
people, and San Marino 28,880.
 11   None of these countries has military forces, a currency, or an 
embassy in the United States, but all were members of the United Nations.  Are any or all of 
these countries?  If none, what about Tonga home to just over 110,000 people?  Luxembourg, 
with less than half a million?  Slovenia with two million?  If one has to draw the line, where 
should it be and why?  
My default is to consider as “countries” all entities referred to as such by the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) in 2005.  This is worthy of some discussion.  First, this includes 
a number of entities sometimes not considered to be “countries” such as the Cayman Islands (a 
British crown colony), Hong Kong (a special administrative region of China), Mayotte (a 
territorial collectivity of France), Puerto Rico (a commonwealth associated with the United 
States), and the West Bank and Gaza strip (not internationally recognized as a de jure part of any 
country).  Further, countries that existed in 2005 did not necessarily exist in 1960, and vice versa.  
For instance, the USSR and Yugoslavia have split into multiple countries; East Germany and the 
separate Yemens no longer exist.  I follow my reasoning not simply because of ease.  It seems 
natural, since it adheres to both the Ricardian notion that factors such as labor are more mobile 
within a country than between countries, and to the existence of a central government with a 
monopoly on legal coercion.
12  Most entities that are only questionably “countries” a) have small   8
populations, and b) are often missing data on variables of interest.  Thus my results do not 
typically depend on the exact definition of “country.”   
Figure A1 in the appendix presents histograms of the population of all independent 
sovereign nations at decadal intervals between 1950 and 2000.  It shows that there is little change 
in either the mean or median log population of a country since WWII, though dispersion in 
country size has been slowly rising. 
 
A Visual Approach 
  Are there benefits or costs to a country being larger?  I begin with a visual survey of the 
relationship between the size and attributes of countries.
13  Size is equated with population, as is 
reasonably standard.
14  I present a series of graphs where different variables are plotted (on the 
ordinate or y-axis) against the natural logarithm of population (on the abscissa or x-axis); each 
country is marked by a dot.  This graphical analysis is exclusively cross-sectional in nature.  I try 
to match dates of the variable of interest to that of the population, and use recent data where 
possible.
15 
  Figure 1 provides scatter-plots of (the natural logarithm of) real GDP per capita against 
(log) population at decadal intervals from 1960 through 2000; both series are taken from the 
WDI.  Data on income adjusted for deviations from purchasing power party (PPP) are available 
from 1980 on, while dollar values are available from 1960.  Each of the points marked represents 
a country.  A linear regression line is also provided; the robust t-statistic for the slope coefficient 
is recorded beneath each scatter-plot.  Significant scale economies would lead one to expect real 
output per person to increase with country size.  However, all eight graphs exhibit a weakly   9
negative relationship between real income per capita and country size.  There is certainly no 
visual evidence that larger countries are richer. 
  Figure 2 examines the relationship between country size and a number of other measures 
of economic well-being using the same graphical technique.  One popular composite measure of 
well-being is the “Human Development Index” which I take from the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report.
16  High human development is insignificantly but negatively associated 
with country size.  More traditional measures of economic well-being are also presented and 
deliver the same message.  Since a few countries had relatively high inflation in 2000, I scatter 
CPI inflation against population size for both the whole sample and excluding the (eleven) 
countries with annual inflation exceeding 20%.
17  Both scatters show an insignificant positive 
relation between country size and inflation, despite the view of e.g., Alesina and Spolaore that 
financial institutions might be expected to be superior and deliver lower inflation in larger 
countries.  It is reassuring to note that openness (trade as a percentage of GDP) is strongly 
negatively associated with country size, as is widely known and expected (e.g., Alesina, Spolaore 
and Wacziarg, 2004, Dahl and Tufte, 1973, Robinson, 1960).
18  Military spending (again, as a 
percentage of GDP) is however not significantly tied to country size.  It is also interesting that 
per capita ownership of automobiles, televisions, telephones, and personal computers all seem to 
decline (usually not significantly so) with country size.   
  Health and education are critical phenomena, both intrinsically and as measures or 
manifestations of economic development.  Further, key parts of education and healthcare are 
often largely provided by the state; economies of scale in providing these public goods might be 
expected to lead to strong linkages between country size and policy outcomes.  But there is in 
fact little evidence that larger states systematically provide better health and education from   10
Figure 3.  Outcome measures such as life expectancy at birth (in 2000) declined (slightly) with 
country size, while the infant mortality rate rose (significantly).  Input measures such as 
immunization rates, access to clean water and sanitation were all higher in smaller countries.  
The rates of literacy, primary school completion, and (both net and gross) secondary school 
enrollment all fell with country size.
19   
  Figure 4 presents evidence on twelve different measures of institutional quality, linking 
each to country size in 2000.  Larger countries tend to be more democratic (though not 
significantly so), when democracy is quantified with the standard Polity IV composite measure.
20  
But political rights, civil rights, and freedom (as measured by Freedom House) are significantly 
lower in larger countries.
21  The same is true of two of the KKZ governance indicators: Voice & 
Accountability and Political Stability, while the perception of corruption is significantly higher 
in larger countries too.
22  The other KKZ measures (Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, the Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, and the Hall and Jones, 1999 measure of 
“Social Infrastructure”) are also (insignificantly) lower in larger countries.  This negative set of 
findings is interesting since it implies that there is little reason to believe that smaller countries 
respond endogenously to scale disadvantages by being more responsive to public demands. 
Many composite measures have been developed of late to compare and rank countries in 
a number of ways; six popular ones are presented in Figure 5.  They are: a) “Economic Freedom” 
as measured by the Heritage Foundation; b) “Country Credit Rating” provided by Institutional 
Investor magazine; c) the “Country Composite Risk Rating” developed by ICRG/Political Risk 
Services; d) the “Competitiveness Ranking” from the Swiss business school IMD (2000); e) the 
“Competitiveness Ranking” from the World Economic Forum (2000), also in Switzerland; and f) 
the “Economic Security Index” from the ILO.
23   None of the correlations indicates that large   11
countries compare well.  Economic freedom, country ratings, country risk, competitiveness, and 
economic security all fall as country size rises. 
The last three variables portrayed in Figure 5 are associated with financial depth.  I 
examine: a) M3 (liquid liabilities), b) quasi-liquid liabilities (M2), and c) domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector, all measured as percentages of GDP.
24  None of the three 
indicators is significantly correlated with country size; two of the three fall with size. 
To summarize: an ocular examination of Figures 1-5 provides no evidence of any strong 
tie between the size of a country and standard measures of economic comfort or well-being.  
Larger countries just do not seem to be more developed than small countries in any systematic 
way. 
Perhaps economic well-being and national institutions do not improve with country size 
because larger nations are systematically more diverse?  This hypothesis, suggested by a number 
of scholars, is investigated in Figure 6, which compares country size with nine different 
measures of national heterogeneity.  Each of the small graphs presents a scatter-plot of a 
different measure of national heterogeneity against the natural logarithm of population. 
There is little evidence that large countries are consistently and significantly more 
heterogeneous than smaller countries.  The graphs are arranged so that heterogeneity rises along 
the ordinate (y-axis).  If larger countries are more heterogeneous, the data should exhibit a 
positive slope.  Six of the nine slopes are indeed positive.  However, only one is significantly 
different from zero at conventional significance levels, the measure of linguistic diversity 
provided by Ethnologue.  Still, the other measure of linguistic fractionalization (provided by 
Alesina et al, 2003) is insignificantly linked to size (the two measures of linguistic heterogeneity 
have a correlation of .81).  Further, ethnic polarization is significantly negatively associated with   12
country size (the Gini coefficient and one of the two measures of religious fractionalization are 
negatively but insignificantly linked to size).
25 
  To sum up, there seems to be no strong visual relationship between a country’s 
population and a host of social phenomena of relevance.  Larger countries do no seem to be 
much richer, healthier, better educated, more diverse, or better off than smaller countries.  There 
is also little evidence from any of the graphical evidence above that one or two outlier countries 
dominate the data.  The first impression one gets is that size simply does not matter. 
 
4. A Statistical Approach 
  The graphical analysis presented above is suggestive but not definitive.  For one thing, 
the analysis is bivariate, and does not control for other phenomena that might be relevant.  
Accordingly, I now verify my visual findings with more rigorous statistical analysis.  I use 
regression analysis to search for a relationship between size and the variables of interest graphed 
above (as always, defining size to be the natural logarithm of population). 
I estimate regressions in a number of different ways.  I use three estimators: OLS; fixed 
effects (when the variables are available for a number of different years); and instrumental 
variables.  Even though there may be little reason to believe that a country’s size is endogenous 
in any important sense (Drazen, 2000), I use the log of total country area as an instrumental 
variable for the log of population.
26  An intercept is included in all regressions; when the 
variables are available for a number of different years, I also include time-specific fixed effects. 
I also estimate both simple bivariate models and models augmented with a number of 
controls suggested by the literature.  I use three different sets of control variables.  I begin with a 
set of twenty: a) the urbanization rate, b) population density, c) the log of absolute latitude   13
(kilometers from equator), d) binary dummy variable for landlocked country, e) island-nation 
dummy, f) High Income country dummy, g) regional dummies for developing countries from 1) 
Latin America, 2) Sub-Saharan Africa, 3) East Asia, 4) South Asia, 5) Europe-Central Asia, 6) 
and Middle East-North Africa, and h) language dummies for countries that speak 1) English, 2) 
French, 3) German, 4) Dutch, 5) Portuguese, 6) Spanish, 7) Arabic, and 8) Chinese.  My second 
set of control variables augments the first set with an additional five: a) dummy for countries 
created post-WW2, b) dummy for countries created after 1800 but before 1945, c) dependency 
dummy, d) OPEC dummy, and e) COMECON dummy.  My last set of controls adds two more 
variables to the second set: a) log real GDP per capita in $, and b) the proportion of land within 
100 km of ice-free coastline or navigable river.
27 
To summarize, I tabulate estimates of the coefficient of interest β which I estimate from: 
 
 y it = βln(Popit) + α + {γtTt} + ΣjδjXijt + {ζiIi} + εit 
 
where: 
o  y is a dependent variable of interest for country i at year t, 
o  Pop denotes population, 
o  {Tt} and {Ii} denote mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive sets of time- and 
country-specific fixed effects, 
o  {Xj} denotes a set of control variables. 
o  ε is a well-behaved residual, and 
o  α, {γ}, {δ}, {ζ} are nuisance coefficients. 
   14
Table 1 records the slope coefficient on country size, along with a robust standard error.  
It is split into six panels, corresponding to the six different sets of graphics; each row 
corresponds to a different dependent variable. The coefficients on the nuisance parameters (for 
the control variables) are suppressed since they are not of intrinsic interest.  The seven columns 
correspond to: a) bivariate OLS with {δ}={ζ}=0; b) OLS with {ζ}=0, controls set #1; c) OLS 
with {ζ}=0, controls set #2; d) OLS with {ζ}=0, controls set #3; e) fixed effects with {δ}=0; f) 
IV with {δ}={ζ}=0; and g) IV with {ζ}=0, controls set #3. 
  Panel A shows that the real income per person is almost always negatively correlated 
with size.  When the data are pooled across years, the relationship is significant at standard 
confidence levels when controls are included.  The same is true of most cross-sections, and all 
the bivariate IV results; it seems reasonable to conclude that larger countries are not 
systematically richer.  If anything, the opposite is a better description of the data.  Table A4 
provides extensive sensitivity analysis that shows that confirms this conclusion. 
  Panel B focuses on the effect of size on a set of economic measures.  The results indicate 
that there is only one reliable relationship: small countries are systematically and substantially 
more open than larger countries.  The effect is economically and statistically significant: a 
country that is 1% larger in population does about 14% less trade (as a percentage of GDP).  This 
not only reproduces conventional wisdom but shows that the techniques I employ can reveal 
significant relationships in the data. 
  The linkages between country size and its health and education are examined in Panel C.  
Almost all the coefficients estimated are insignificant, and a number show that larger countries 
are associated with worse outcomes.  Of the eight OLS estimates that are significantly differently 
different from zero at the .05 level, four show that size helps.  All nine bivariate IV estimates are   15
significant, and all indicate that larger countries perform worse (though these are insignificant 
when controls are added).  The results are also poor in Panel D, which searches for an effect of 
size on institutions.  Again, most of the coefficients are indistinguishable from zero.  Of the 
twenty-nine significant coefficients, only six indicate that size is associated with better 
institutions.  The estimates of Panel E link size to six international rankings and three measures 
of financial depth.  Only domestic bank credit (measured as a percentage of GDP) rises 
significantly with GDP, and even then only when OLS is used but fixed country effects are not 
included (the within estimator is significantly negative). 
  Panel F confirms that my nine measures of national heterogeneity are not closely tied to 
country size with OLS techniques.  Of the thirty-six coefficients tabulated, five are significantly 
different from zero at the .05 level or better.  Of these, three link size positively to heterogeneity 
while ethnic polarization is significantly lower for larger countries in two of the four regressions.  
On the other hand, five of the nine bivariate IV estimates indicate that larger countries are 
significantly more heterogeneous than smaller countries.  Even this moderate result is fragile: 
only one of the nine coefficients (that for geographic dispersion) is significantly positive when 
controls are added. 
  To summarize: the statistical analysis broadly confirms the impression left by the graphs.  
There is little evidence that countries with more people perform measurably better.  Indeed a 
good broad-brush characterization is that a country’s population has no significant consistent 
impact on its well-being.  The one strong and well-known exception is that smaller countries are 
consistently and significantly more open to international trade than larger countries.
28 
   16
5. Remaining Issues 
It would be natural and interesting to compare crime rates across countries.  The key 
issue here is the fact that different jurisdictions collect crime data in incompatible ways; in 2000, 
the UN data set indicates that the country with the lowest crime rate was Pakistan with a rate of 
2.23/100,000 inhabitants (the second-highest crime rate was Sweden in 1990 with 14,240).
29  A 
simple regression of the crime rate against the log of population delivers a negative effect of 
country size on the crime rate if one controls for year effects, but a positive effect if one controls 
for country effects.  It would also be interesting to extend the analysis to cover conflicts, civil 
and external.
 30  Finally, the post-war patterns may not be representative of earlier periods of 
time, especially given the large waves of migration that have occurred historically.  Indeed, if an 
accurate data set could be constructed, emigration and immigration would be useful to analyze 
since they are prima facie indicators of a country’s well-being. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
  This paper is motivated by the fact that countries have vastly different sizes.  To my 
knowledge, there is no theoretical model that explains the wide variation in size across countries.  
Should we worry?  My initial answer is negative.  In this empirical paper, I have searched for but 
not found evidence that country size (measured as population) matters for economic outcomes.  
More precisely, I have not been able to find a consistent strong country scale effect on any 
phenomena other than openness.  Country size simply seems not to matter. 
This seems unsurprising.  If larger countries offered a systematically higher quality of 
life, this would be part of common culture and received street wisdom.  My finding is also   17
consistent with received wisdom; for instance Dahl and Tufte (1973, p19) state “… we also find 
that levels of socioeconomic development are independent of total population …” 
While this work is an exploratory exercise, it does have ramifications for existing 
academic research.  Many economic models – in economic growth, international trade, urban 
economics, and public finance – imply that the size of larger countries is economically 
advantageous in should deliver higher output, cheaper public goods, and so forth.  A number of 
political philosophers argue that larger countries should have inferior institutions.  Given the 
theoretical importance of size in many economic and political models, it may also be interesting 
to ask why size seems not to matter.  Scale effects may occur only at the sub-national level.  I 
find no evidence that small countries endogenously overcome their disadvantages by becoming 
more effective at providing public or private goods, others may have more success in finding 
offsetting effects.  There may also be more subtle ways to find national scale effects, e.g., by 
employing different controls or more structural techniques.  Such issues may warrant future 
research. 
  Agents with large endowments tend to be proud of them, often considering them to be so 
intrinsically valuable as to compensate for a variety of other defects.  Are they?  In this paper I 
have asked whether countries endowed with large populations have measurably higher economic 
welfare.  The answer is negative; the size – population – of a country seems to have little 
relationship to most anything of economic interest.  This seems intuitive, is consistent with 
conventional wisdom and allows one to understand that countries vary enormously in size.  A 
country’s size just doesn’t seem to matter for its economic institutions and performance.   18
References 
 
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory (MIT Press: Cambridge). 
 
Alcalá, Francisco and Antonio Ciccone (2003) “Trade, Extent of the Market, and Economic 
Growth 1960-1996” unpublished. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain 
Wacziarg (2003) “Fractionalization” Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155-194. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore (2003) The Size of Nations (MIT Press: Cambridge). 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore, and Romain Wacziarg (2004) “Economic Integration and 
Political Disintegration” American Economic Review 90-5, 1276-1296.  
 
Alesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore, and Romain Wacziarg (2004) “Trade, Growth and the Size of 
Countries” forthcoming in Aghion and Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth (North 
Holland: Amsterdam). 
 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995) Economic Growth (McGraw-Hill: New York). 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford Economic 
Papers 56(4), 563-595. 
 
Dahl, R.A. and E.R. Tufte (1973) Size and Democracy (Stanford University Press: Stanford). 
 
Drazen, Allan (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton). 
 
Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables (1999) The Spatial Economy (MIT 
Press: Cambridge). 
 
Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew D. Mellinger (1998) “Geography and 
Economic Development” NBER Working Paper No. 6849. 
 
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones (1999) “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More 
Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114-1, 83-116. 
 
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul R. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade (MIT 
Press: Cambridge). 
 
Hess, Gregory D. and Eric van Wincoop (2000) Intranational Macroeconomics (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge), 
 
International Institute for Management Development (2000) The World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 2000.   19
 
International Labour Organization (2004) Economic Security for a Better World (ILO: Geneva). 
 
Jones, Charles I. (1999) “Growth: With or Without Scale Effects?” American Economic Review 
89-2, 139-144. 
 
Krugman, Paul R. (1980) “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation and the Pattern of Trade” 
American Economic Review 70-5, 950-959. 
 
Myrdal, Gunnar (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (Pantheon Press: 
New York). 
 
Olson, Mancur (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press: New Haven). 
 
Robinson, E.A.G. (1960) Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (St. Martin’s Press: 
New York). 
 
Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban and Mark Wright (2004) “Urban Structure and Growth” unpublished. 
 
Sala-i-Martin Xavier X. (1997) “I Just Ran Four Million Regressions” NBER Working Paper No 
6252. 
 
Ventura, Jaume (2005) “A Global View of Economic Growth” NBER Working Paper 11,296. 
 
Wei, Shang-Jin (1991) “To Divide or to Unite?  A Theory of Secession” unpublished. 
 
World Economic Forum (2000) The Global Competitiveness Report 2000 (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford).   20
Table 1: Regression Results 
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Slope coefficient for log of country population; robust standard errors (clustered by countries, where appropriate) in parentheses.  
Intercept/year effects are included but not recorded. * (**) indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 (.01) level.  
OLS estimates unless noted.   Controls set #1 (20 variables) includes: urbanization rate, density rate, and dummy variables for 
“countries” that are a) landlocked, island dummy, log of latitude (kilometers from equator), regional dummies for developing 
countries from Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Europe-Central Asia, Middle East-North Africa, High 
Income country dummy, and language dummies for English, French, German, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese. 
Controls set #2 (25 variables) includes all controls in 1 plus: dummies for post-WW2 country, (1800,1945) country, and 
dependencies, OPEC members, and COMECON members.  Controls set #3 (27 variables) includes all controls in sets 2 (and 1) 
plus: log real GDP per capita in $; and proportion of land within 100 km of ice-free coastline or navigable river.  Income is 
excluded as a control in income equations  Fixed effects adds country-specific fixed effects.  IV uses log of total area as 
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Appendix Table A2: Data Sources 
•  World Development Indicators (http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/index.html): population; real 
GDP per capita; inflation; trade openness; military spending; cars; televisions; telephones; personal 
computers; infant mortality; DPT Immunization rate; access to sanitation; literacy rate; primary school 
completion rate; gross and net secondary school enrollment rates; domestic bank credit; quasi-liquid 
liabilities; M3; density; urbanization; high-income and regional groupings. 
•  CIA World Factbook (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/): independence date; Gini 
coefficient; geographic and linguistic controls. 
•  UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/): human development index; life expectancy at birth; access 
to improved water. 
•  KKZ (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm): voice and accountability; political 
stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption. 
•  Collier-Hoeffler (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/g&g.zip): ethnic fractionalization; ethnic polarization; 
geographic dispersion; religious fractionalization. 
•  Alesina et al (2003) (http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls): ethnic 
fractionalization; linguistic fractionalization; religious fractionalization. 
•  Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/): political and civil rights; freedom. 
•  Polity IV (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/): polity. 
•  Gallup, Sachs and Messinger (http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/data): proportion of land close to 
navigation. 
•  Transparency International (http://www.icgg.org/overview.csv): perception of corruption. 
•  Hall and Jones (http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/datasets.html): social infrastructure. 
•  Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm): index of economic 
freedom. 
•  ICRG (http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html): country risk. 
•  ILO (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/definition.pdf): economic 
security index. 
•  Ethnologue (http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/contents.asp): linguistic fractionalization. 
•  IMD (The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 p25): country overall ranking. 
•  WEF (The Global Competitiveness Report 2000 Table 1, p44): CCI ranking. 
•  Institutional Investor magazine (Institutional Investor March 2000 pp150-1): credit rating.   31
Appendix Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev, 
Min Max 
Log Population  1040 14.75 2.32  8.94 20.96 
Log real GDP per capita, $  712 7.43 1.53 4.48  10.75 
Log real GDP per capita, PPP  458 8.45 1.11 6.13  10.94 
Human Development Index  367 .67  .19 .256 .95 
CPI Inflation  504 55.8  499.8  -5.3  7485. 
Trade Openness  671 73.3 44.8 3.7 287.4 
Life Expectancy at Birth  344 61.8 12.6 32.4 81.6 
Infant Mortality Rate  872 6.9 5.4  .3 28.5 
Literacy Rate  477 69.1  26.1 5.7 99.8 
Primary School Completion Rate  202 79.1 26.6  12  121 
Polity  630 .1 7.6 -10 10 
Political Rights  501 3.9 2.3  1  7 
Civil Rights  501 3.9 1.9  1  7 
Voice and Accountability  189 -.0  1.0 -2.1 1.6 
Political Stability  165 -.0  1.0 -2.8 1.7 
Perceived Corruption  197 5.1 2.6  0  10 
Social Infrastructure  126  .5 .3 .1 1 
Economic Freedom  387 5.7 1.3 2.3 8.7 
Institutional Investor Credit  144 40.7  25.1 5.7 93.8 
ICRG Country Risk  139 67.9 11.7 34.8 90.8 
Domestic Bank Credit  592 48.4 41.3  .0  317. 
Ethnic Fractionalization (ADEKW)  186 .44 .26  0  .93 
Linguistic Fractionalization  191 .39 .28 .00 .92 
Geographic Dispersion  132 .61 .18 .15 .97 
Religious Fractionalization (ADEKW)  203 .44 .23 .00 .86 
Log Area  1040 10.95 2.96  .69  16.65   32
Appendix Table A4: Sensitivity Analysis on Real GDP per capita 
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Slope coefficient for log of country population; robust standard errors (clustered by countries, where appropriate) in 
parentheses.  Intercept/year effects are included but not recorded. * (**) indicates significantly different from zero at 
the .05 (.01) level.   Regressand is log real GDP per capita in $. 
OLS estimates unless noted.   Controls set #1 (20 variables) includes: urbanization rate, density rate, and dummy 
variables for “countries” that are a) landlocked, island dummy, log of latitude (kilometers from equator), regional 
dummies for developing countries from Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Europe-Central 
Asia, Middle East-North Africa, High Income country dummy, and language dummies for English, French, German, 
Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese. 
Controls set #2 (25 variables) includes all controls in 1 plus: dummies for post-WW2 country, (1800,1945) country, 
and dependencies, OPEC members, and COMECON members.  Controls set #3 (27 variables) includes all controls in 
sets 2 (and 1) plus proportion of land within 100 km of ice-free coastline or navigable river.  Income is excluded as a 
control in income equations  Fixed effects adds country-specific fixed effects.  IV uses log of total area as instrumental 
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Figure A1: Histograms of Country Size over Time   34
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Using data from the CIA’s World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
2 This has been noted since at least Dahle and Tufte (1973). 
3 On the other hand, it may also be unexpected.  Plato thought there was an optimal state size; more on this later.  In 
1984 George Orwell described a world with three giant states of approximately equal size. 
4 In passing, I note that the models AS develop are symmetric by assumption, and are not designed to deliver 
heterogeneously sized countries. 
5 Drazen (2000) provides an excellent critique, and emphasizes (among other things) that public goods can be 
supplied by clubs instead of countries. 
6 It is interesting to note that Plato’s logic was that 5,040 is divisible by all numbers 1 through 10.  Indeed, 5,040 is a 




7 Jean Jacques Rousseau in The Government of Poland quoted at 
http://www.brothersjudd.com/blog/archives/010141.html. 
8 De l’Esprit des Lois Vol I, Book 8, p 131. 
9 There is also a modern strain of political thought which argues that larger countries are inferior; E.F. Schumacher 
and especially Leopold Kohr (especially in The Breakdown of Nations) are among the more well-known writers. 
10 The main focus of Alesina, Spolaore and Waczairg (2000) is to check that both openness and size have a positive 
effect growth of real income, while the interaction between openness and size has a negative effect.  They also find 
weaker evidence showing similar results for the level of real income.  When I use my data set (which includes more 
countries sampled at longer intervals) to examine the determinants of real income levels, I find similar results that 
are statistically insignificant using the log of population to measure size. 
11 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
12 The correspondence is imperfect for both definitions.  Labor is mobile between countries over long periods of 
time.  Dependencies do not have a complete monopoly over legal coercion (though since mother countries rarely 
exercise their rights, it is typically a de facto near-complete monopoly); neither do sovereign nation states (think of 
the Korean or first Gulf wars).  Other definitions of a country include the “Westphalian state” (an entity that enjoys 
extensive autonomy in its domestic economic and social policy, largely free from interference from other states and 
powers) and that taken from the 1933 Montevideo Convention (the state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states); see http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/State. 
13 I focus on outcomes rather than inputs such as spending; AS provide some evidence on the latter. 
14 Dahl and Tufte (1973, p17) state “Most discussions of the relation between size and popular government use 
population as their criterion of size …”  I note in passing that in 2000, the correlation between the natural logarithms 
of countries’ surface areas and populations was .84. 
15  The observations for some variables were collected at different points of time (sometimes not around the years 
for which I have population data), which may be an issue.  Further, I only use data at decadal intervals, another 
potential problem.  I do not consider either issue to be of overwhelming importance, since my variables tend to be 
quite persistent, but it may be worth pursuing. 
16 It is hard to describe the HDI precisely is.  The UNDP states (http://hdr.undp.org/hd/glossary.cfm), “Human 
development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. Enlarging people’s choices is achieved by expanding human 
capabilities and functionings. At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for human development 
are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. If these 
basic capabilities are not achieved, many choices are simply not available and many opportunities remain 
inaccessible. But the realm of human development goes further: essential areas of choice, highly valued by people, 
range from political, economic and social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying self-respect, 
empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community.  The concept of human development is a holistic one 
putting people at the centre of all aspects of the development process.” 
17 The eleven countries with recorded annual CPI inflation exceeding 20% in 2000 are: Angola, Belarus, Burundi, 
Congo (Dem. Rep.), Ecuador, Ghana, Laos, Malawi, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Suriname, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
18 Openness is taken from the WDI, as are most of the other series mentioned below unless explicitly noted 
otherwise.   35
                                                                                                                                                             
19 It would be natural and interesting to compare crime rates across countries.  The key issue here is the fact that 
different jurisdictions collect crime data in incompatible ways; in 2000, the UN data set indicates that the country 
with the lowest crime rate was Pakistan with a rate of 2.23/100,000 inhabitants (the second-highest crime rate was 
Sweden in 1990 with 14,240); see www.unodc.org.  A simple regression of the crime rate against the log of 
population delivers a negative effect of country size on the crime rate if one controls for year effects, but a positive 
effect if one controls for country effects. 
20 The Polity IV project is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ 
21 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
22  The KKZ data on aggregate governance indicators are available from the World Bank’s website at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm, while the Transparency International corruption 
perceptions index is available at http://www.icgg.org/overview.csv 
23  On the ESI, the ILO states “We propose that it is the combination of securities that make up economic security, 
and that this constitutes a decent work environment… In a sense, decent work can be said to exist when individuals 
have a decent level of income security, decent representation security, decent work security, and the real freedom to 
pursue whatever of the other forms of work-related securities they desire. … Economic security is measured as a 
combination of the normalized values of the seven socio-economic security indexes to yield a composite measure 
designated the Economic Security Index (ESI). The ESI is defined as a weighted average of the scores of the seven 
forms of security, in which double weight is given to income security and to representation security, for reasons that 
basic income security is essential for real freedom to make choices and that representation security is essential to 
enable the vulnerable to retain income security.  The ILO provides definitions of “economic security” at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/definition.pdf.  
24 The WDI defines the latter two as follows: 
“Quasi-liquid liabilities are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus time and savings 
deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements, plus 
travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held 
by residents. They equal the M3 money supply less transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1).”  
“Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and 
deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do 
not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other 
banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations.” 
25 Perhaps the most striking feature of the figure is the cross-country diversity in domestic diversity, not the fact that 
the variation is not closely linked to country size. 
26 The first stage fits well; when I regress the log of population against the log of area (and time dummies), I get an 
R
2 of .68 and a robust t-statistic on log area of 19. 
27 Clearly the third set of controls cannot be added when the regressand is real GDP per capita.  Also, since all the 
measures of heterogeneity are cross-sectional no fixed effects estimates are possible for Panel F. 
28 I have also substituted both the log of the labor force and the log of the population between ages 15 and 64 in 
place of the log of population.  Neither alternative measure of country size leads to different conclusions. 
29 The UN data are available through www.unodc.org. 
30 Dahl and Tufte (1973, p 122) conclude “… a country’s chances of survival do not depend significantly on its 
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